Opacity

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Description

This pattern means that important information is kept secret from citizens. This is useful when hiding corruption, nepotism, money laundering, smuggling, vote buying, tax evasion, etc. When information is kept private there is less chance that malfeasance can be noticed. With Opacity in place, over the years elite business and governments can distance themselves further and further away from any controls on them.

How it works

Keeping things from the public eye can be maintained through laws or through habit. Sometimes when there are transparency laws, a government can designate things to be secret in order to maintain state security.[1] It is widely speculated that government will often classify documents for personal reasons or non-security reasons, but when the government It is interesting to note that even if there is transparency, societal apathy can mean that corruption and other crimes can continue without interruption.

Opacity prevents people from seeing how business and governments actually conduct their affairs. This encourages corruption because there is no oversight.

It can also establish this as a habit which ultimately can be seen as the "natural state of affairs", the way things are actually supposed to be.

Evidence

Freedom of information laws are routinely challenged by governments around the world. In the US, despite the Freedom of Information Act, official requests for information are routinely denied dispite the information falling into categories that are permitted within the FOIA.[2]

Links

Corruption and Fraud, Professional Obfuscation, Forbidden Knowledge, Hidden Agendas

References

http://www.helleniccomserve.com/opacity.html

  1. The Conflicts Behind Government Opacity. http://www.cityethics.org/node/627, Retrieved March, 7 2014.
  2. Roberts, Alasdair. Blacked out: Government secrecy in the information age. Cambridge University Press, 2006.